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THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
IN FEDERAL TAX INVESTIGATIONS
Graham Stafford* and T. Victor Jackson**
INTRODUCTION
A government that relies on a system of self-assessment for the
collection of its revenues must be granted broad powers to enforce its
tax laws.' Thus, the Internal Revenue Code contains a battery of
provisions that, inter alia, requires the preparation and retention of
substantial records,2 imposes the duty to file accurate returns:' and
remit the required tax,' and grants the Internal Revenue Service
broad powers to examine documents and interrogate individuals for
the purpose of verifying the accuracy of returns and ascertaining the
liability for tax) Overall, the system works well because of a high
level of voluntary compliance.' However, an individual may stand
firm and point to the accusatory system of justice which requires the
government to prove its case against the individual without his coop-
eration. At this point the governmental right to investigate for the
protection of the revenue clashes with the individual's constitutional
rights. Curtailment of governmental powers in tax investigations is
particularly troublesome because in virtually every case, the govern-
ment cannot proceed to determine civil liability, and a fortiori
criminal intent, without some cooperation from the taxpayer; the
needed evidence, the instrumentalities of the crime, are often within
the taxpayer's possession or within his personal knowledge. In bal-
ancing the governmental interest against the individual's privilege
* Member, New Orleans Bar.
** Prehearing Attorney, Michigan Court of Appeals.
1. "The fact is that Congress built the tax code upon the principle of self-
assessment and voluntary compliance with the Code's rules and regulations. To deter-
mine deviations from its rules, the IRS must place unusual reliance upon the tax-
payer's own records and statements." United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 850
(5th Cir. 1969).
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 274, 6001.
3. Id. §§ 6011-6110.
4. Id. §§ 6151-57.
5. Id. §§ 7602-09, 7402.
6. Reasons advanced for a high degree of voluntary compliance include (a) the
overall fairness of revenue laws in substance and application, (b) the law-abiding
character of the citizen, (c) a feeling of helplessness, and (d) fear of sanctions for
noncompliance. See Lyons, Government Power and Citizens Rights in a Tax Investiga-
tion, 25 TAX LAWYER 79, 98 (1971).
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against compulsory self-incrimination and other constitutional
rights, the statutorily grounded governmental interest must yield to
the fundamental rights of the individual. Although important poli-
cies dictate that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
be liberally construed, it is not an absolute source of protected si-
lence.7 Moreover, while a constitutional guarantee can never be sub-
ordinated to the law enforcement function, it should not be allowed
to unduly frustrate legitimate governmental functions; therefore, in
weighing competing interests, the courts have attempted to keep the
self-incrimination right within meaningful bounds. It is in this light
that we shall examine the application of the privilege against compul-
sory self-incrimination in tax investigations.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PROCEDURE
In order to discharge his statutory duty "to inquire after and
concerning all persons . . . who may be liable to pay any internal
revenue tax"' the Internal Revenue Code provides the Secretary of
the Treasury and his delegates with an arsenal of investigatory pow-
ers." Both internal revenue agents and special agents 1 are granted
authority to examine and summon any person to appear and produce
books, records, and other relevant data for the purpose of (1) ascer-
taining the correctness of any return, (2) making a return where none
has been made, (3) determining the liability of any person for any
federal tax, and (4) collecting any tax liability." A summoned party
may also be required to testify as to any information "relevant or
material to such inquiry.' ' 2
7. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973).
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7601.
9. Id. §§ 7602-08.
10. Treas. Reg. § 301.7602-1(c) (1972). It should be noted that Revenue investiga-
tors operating under authority of § 7608 have not been delegated authority to issue a
summons by virtue of the regulations.
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602. Although section 7601 provides that it is the
duty of the Commissioner to "canvass the area" for tax violators, there is no authority
for the Service to utilize the section 7602 summons power to aid in a section 7601
canvass. In United States v. Humble Oil, 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1974), the Fifth Circuit
held "the Internal Revenue Service is not empowered by § 7602 to issue a summons
in aid of its § 7601 research projects or inquiries, absent an investigation of taxpayers
or individuals and corporations from whom information is sought." 488 F.2d at 962.
But see Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1964). Nor can the Service use
the summons to conduct a "fishing expedition." United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d
749, 754 (4th Cir. 1973). But see United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1973);
cf. United States v. Humble Oil, 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1974).
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602(3).
[Vol. 34
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A negligent" or willful failure to appear or produce may subject
the individual summoned to criminal sanctions. However, no risk of
criminal sanction or contempt exists if the person appears before the
"hearing examiner' '1 5 and in "good faith" asserts that production of
the evidence would violate an established privilege, that he is physi-
cally unable to comply, or any other defense. " Since the Service lacks
the power to compel compliance, 7 the agent must petition the district
court for enforcement. 5
If the agent believes the summoned party's defenses to the sum-
mons are without merit,"' a petition is filed with the district court for
an order to show cause, directing the summoned party to appear and
show why compliance with the summons should not be compelled.2
The government alleges that (a) the summons was served, (b) the
investigation is pursuant to a legitimate purpose, (c) the information
sought may be relevant to that purpose and not already in the Inter-
nal Revenue Service's possession, 2' and (d) all administrative steps
13. Id. § 7210. (Where a person neglects to appear at a hearing after being duly
summoned to appear, he may be fined or imprisoned or both.) It is generally recognized
that the person must have completely disregarded the summons before he is subjected
to liability under this section. See Burroughs, The Use of Administrative Summons in
Federal Tax Investigations, 9 VILL. L. REV. 371, 376-77 (1964).
14. Id. § 7203. See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933) (willfulness
equated with bad faith and evil motive). See also United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S.
346 (1973).
15. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964). The "hearing examiner" is almost
always the agent who issues the summons.
16. Id.
17. Although the Revenue Service power to summons has been likened to that of
a grand jury, United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967), it is clear that a
witness "who refuses to comply with the grand jury subpoena may be the immediate
subject of a contempt proceeding instituted by simple notice." Fink, Use and Abuse
of the Grand Jury in the Criminal Tax Investigation 50 TAXES 325, 327 (1972).
18. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7604(a). "If any person is summoned under the
internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or
other data, the United States district court for the district in which such person resides
or is found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance,
testimony, or production of books, papers, records or other data." See also INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 7402(b).
19. Typically, where the taxpayer refuses to comply with the IRS summons to
produce on the grounds of the fifth amendment, the Service will not petition for
enforcement.
20. The use of show cause procedures to rule a summoned party into court has
been upheld as "appropriate" and "adequate" in United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d
165 (5th Cir. 1971).
21. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). Although the Code provisions
dealing with the summons power are said to be given a liberal construction, United
States v. Humble Oil, 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d
174, 176 (5th Cir. 1967); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir.), cert.
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have been taken." Prior to the enforcement proceeding the sum-
moned party is precluded from seeking judicial relief.2 '
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the adversary en-
forcement proceeding. However, under Rule 81(a) (3) as read by the
Supreme Court in Donaldson v. United States,2' the district court
may exercise broad discretionary powers to limit application of the
Rules in the enforcement proceeding. 2 5 If the court orders enforce-
ment, a refusal to comply subjects the party to contempt. Since the
order enforcing the summons is a final judgment, 2 the party may
appeal the decision and request a stay of execution.2 7
denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953), the court has the affirmative duty to prevent an "abuse
of its process." Powell requires that the material sought be both relevant and material
to the inquiry. This test of relevancy was recognized as more than "an idle hope that
something may be discovered" in United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d
Cir. 1968); but "whether the inspection sought might have thrown light upon the
correctness of taxpayer's return," see United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274
(1973) (and the cases cited therein), the burden of proving relevancy is on the govern-
ment. Compare United States v. Mothe, 303 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. La. 1969) with United
States v. Vey, 324 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (as to who has the burden to show
investigation conducted with legitimate purpose). Powell answers that question by
placing the burden on the government. See also United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d
165, 169 (5th Cir. 1971). "Before the Government is called upon to make this showing
[of legitimate purposel, the summoned party must raise in a substantial way the
existence of substantial deficiencies in the summons proceedings." Is this a correct
formulation of the Powell rule?
22. A summons must be served by delivery of an attested copy in hand to the
person summoned, or left at his last and usual place of abode. When the summons calls
for production of documents they must be described with reasonable certainty. INT.
REV. ConE OF 1954, § 7603. The summons must state the time and place of the exami-
nation. The date selected for the examination shall not be less than ten days from the
date of the issuance. Id. § 7605(a). No taxpayer shall be subjected to an unnecessary
examination or to a second examination for the same taxable period unless taxpayer
requests otherwise or the Service notifies taxpayer in writing that an additional inspec-
tion is necessary. See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R. Fed. 484 (1971). The second examina-
tion rule does not apply to third parties. United States v. Krilich, 470 F.2d 341 (2d
Cir. 1972).
23. United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Pa. 1973)(motion to quash
improper; time to challenge Revenue summons is at enforcement proceedings).
24. 400 U.S. 517, 528 (1971): "The Civil Rules, of course, do have an application
to a summons proceeding. Rule 81(a) (3) expressly so provides. But the Civil Rules are
not inflexible in this application. Rule 81(a) (3) goes on specifically to recognize that
a district court, by-local rule or by order, may limit the application of the rules in a
summons proceeding."
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3). See United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165 (5th Cir.
1971). See also Note, 32 Mn. L. REV. 143 (1972).
26. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440
(1964).
27. See generally Crowley, The Role of the Practitioner When His Client Faces a
Criminal Tax Fraud Investigation, 40 J. TAXATION 18 (1974).
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Frequently, the person summoned is not the taxpayer but his
accountant, attorney, or some other person who may possess informa-
tion relevant to a determination of the taxpayer's liability. Although
taxpayer may understandably desire to intervene to prevent compli-
ance, the Service is not required to give taxpayer notice of a summons
issued to a third party,2" and he has no absolute right to intervene in
the enforcement proceeding." It is clear, however, that the taxpayer
may intervene at the examination before the hearing officer.'
NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
When Dean Griswold described the privilege against self-
incrimination as "one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to
make himself civilized, "" he was doubtlessly reflecting on the pur-
poses and the policies underlying the privilege. Probably no clearer
statement of reasons supporting the fifth amendment can be found
than in the following passage from Justice Goldberg's opinion in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York: :2
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspi-
rations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to
the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our
preference for an accustorial rather than an inquisitorial system
of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements
will be elicted by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of
fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance by requir-
ing the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder
the entire load . . . our respect for the inviolability of the human
personality and of the right of each individual to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life, . . . our distrust of self-
deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege,
28. Scarafiotti v. Shea, 456 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1972); In re Cole, 342 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
29. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971). In United States v. Luther,
481 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1973), the Ninth Circuit interprets Donaldson to mean
"[j intervention is not a matter of right but the court in its discretion, upon showing
by the taxpayer of some protectable interest may permit intervention." See the text
at note 171 infra for a discussion of intervention.
30. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964). See also the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Douglas in Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 538 (1971): "Our deci-
sions, however, make clear that the taxpayer has the right to be present at the hearing
and to confront and cross-examine witnesses and inspect evidence against him." But
see United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1971).
31. E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
32. 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
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while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a protection to
the innocent.
The protection of the fifth amendment privilege extends only to
(1) compulsory revelations of (2) a testimonial or communicative
character (3) which may potentially incriminate (4) the individual
who is the object of the compulsion. :':' The component parts of this
statement define the parameters of the protection afforded by the
privilege.
The principle that the privilege is applicable only when there
exists an element of governmental compulsion generally eliminates
any fifth amendment issue where the taxpayer voluntarily provides
information to revenue agents." Moreover, since the compulsion
must be exerted upon the person potentially incriminated, the privi-
lege cannot be invoked by a third person on the grounds that it might
incriminate the taxpayer. :", Similarly, only natural persons may
assert its shield; thus impersonal organizations such as corpora-
tions, :" partnerships, :7 and labor organizations"" are excluded. The
personal character rationale has been utilized by the courts to defeat
the privilege where individual taxpayers conduct their affairs in an
essentially personal manner but through a corporation. Thus, sub-
chapter S corporations, : ' professional corporations, 4' and one-man
33. 8 J. WImMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
34. See text at note 183 infra.
35. Duly summoned third parties are required to comply with an administrative
summons regardless of their incriminating character. First Nat. Bank v. United States,
160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947); McMann v. Securities Ex. Comm'n, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.
1937). The party ought to be able to invoke the privilege to prevent the production of
evidence tending to incriminate him. But see United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99
(9th Cir. 1973) (attorney unsuccessful in asserting privileges in his own behalf as to
taxpayer's records).
36. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906).
:37. Bellis v. United States, 42 U.S.L.W. 4788 (May 28, 1974), affirming In re
Grand Jury Invest. Bellis, 483 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Wernes, 157
F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1946); United States v. Brasley, 268 F. 59 (W.D. Pa. 1920); United
States v. Linen Serv. Coun., 141 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1956); United States v. Onassis,
133 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y.
1953); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1948). The publicly
syndicated limited partnership, prevalent in the tax shelter area will normally have
no claim under the privilege. United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1963).
38. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
:39. United States v. Richardson, 72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 85,935 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Mid-West Bus. Forms, Inc., 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 80,496 (8th Cir. 1973).
40. United States v. Theodore, 347 F. Supp. 1070 (D.S.C. 1972); United States v.
Graham, 72-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. 85,203 (D. Mont. 1972).
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corporations" have all been denied the protection of the constitu-
tional privilege. To hold that an individual forfeits his constitutional
rights by choosing a corporate form of business evidences a failure to
examine the pivotal elements of the privilege.12 The better approach
would be to examine the size, nature, and character of the organiza-
tion to determine application of the privilege. 2.'
The personal character of the privilege has also been used by the
courts to deny protection to individuals in possession of corporate
records. ': This may be a practical extension of the rule which denies
protection to impersonal organizations, since corporations and other
impersonal organizations act only through officers and employees.
This rule appears to run afoul of the purposes and policies" of the
privilege in cases where an individual is compelled to produce records
in his possession that may incriminate him. 5 According to Couch v.
United States, Il possession, not ownership, is the proper touchstone
of the privilege. While a custodian may be compelled under present
law to produce corporate records in his possession, he may not be
compelled to testify regarding their content, since "[b]y accepting
custodianship . . . he has voluntarily assumed a duty which over-
41. Wright v. Detwiler, 345 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1965); Hair Ind., Inc. v. United
States, 340 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965); Christianson v. United
States, 226 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1955). But see Application of Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (privilege applicable to one-man foreign corporation).
42. See the dissenting opinion of Judge Madden in Wild v. Brewer, 329 F.2d 924,
925 (9th Cir. 1964).
42.1 Apparently, the Supreme Court has adopted this approach. See Bellis v.
United States, 42 U.S.L.W. 4788, 4793 (May 28, 1974): "Every State has now adopted
laws permitting incorporation of professional associations, and increasing numbers of
lawyers, doctors, and other professionals are choosing to conduct their business affairs
in the corporate form rather than the more traditional partnership. Whether corpora-
tion or partnership, many of these firms will be independent entities whose financial
records are held by a member of the firm in a representative capacity. In these circum-
stances, the applicability of the privilege should not turn on an insubstantial difference
in the form of the business enterprise. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum,
358 F. Supp. 661, 668 (Md. 1973)." Unfortunately, the Court has used the approach
to deny the privilege.
43. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
44. Where the records are not in the possession of the person summoned, and their
location might incriminate him, the summoned party cannot be forced to testify as to
the material's whereabouts. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
45. A partial solution to this problem is offered by Wigmore. The summons should
be served on the corporation which could respond through an officer or agent who could
respond to the summons without fear of self-incrimination. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2200 (1961). Unfortunately, in many small corporations, there may be no one who
fits the description.
46. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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rides his claim of privilege, only with respect to the production of the
records themselves.' 7
The fifth amendment privilege does not afford protection against
production of evidence of a "nontestimonial" or "noncommunica-
tive" character. Thus, individuals suspected of crime have been
forced to remove their clothing in order to display identifiable physi-
cal characteristics,' demonstrate their voice"' and handwriting," and
yield the contents of their blood stream for purposes of determining
alcohol."
Finally, it is important to understand when the privilege may be
invoked. While the language of the fifth amendment appears to limit
the privilege to testimony in "a criminal case," an individual may
refuse to testify or produce information at any time or in any proceed-
ing if the information furnished might incriminate him, unless im-
munity has been granted.
TESTINC. ASSERTION OF THE PRIVILEGE
When an individual summoned believes his best interests are
served by invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, he must
appear before the hearing examiner and assert his defenses to the
summons."2 In many instances, the hearing examiner will proceed to
interrogate the witness from a set of typewritten questions. Because
the privilege creates no absolute sanctuary of protected silence," ' the
47. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 124-25 (1957).
48. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
49. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
50. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967). Special agents occasionally insist that they have the right to demand that
taxpayer identify his handwriting upon request on the theory such evidence is physical
and thus unprotected by the constitutional privilege. It is doubtful that taxpayer must
respond. The agent has the right to require a handwriting exemplar and have it identi-
fied as that of the taxpayer.
51. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
52. See text at note 15 supra.
53. It might be argued that the taxpayer should have an absolute right to remain
silent. The Miranda warning states that the individual has the right to remain silent
and Mathis indicates that no distinction is to be made between tax fraud and other
crimes. The reasons for allowing the summoned party to remain silent may be stated
as follows: (1) Interrogation places the individual under stress. If he is forced to deter-
mine the applicability of the privilege on a question by question basis, he may become
confused and reveal evidence which the privilege was designed to shield. Special agents
understand the problem and use it to the government's advantage. See Inbau, Police
Interrogation - A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 16 (1961). (2) The rules
place an almost impossible burden on the trial court judge. How can he know whether
a particular answer will be incriminating or lead to incriminating evidence? Is he in a
better position to make the judgment than the taxpayer? The answer to a seemingly
[Vol. 34
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summoned individual cannot make a blanket refusal to testify) Only
when the answer to a particular question would be incriminating per
se, tend to incriminate, or otherwise lead to incriminating evidence
may the witness properly refuse to answer. Thus, the hearing pro-
ceeds and the witness must invoke the privilege after each question."
If the government believes invocation of the privilege is unwarranted,
it may petition the district court to order the witness to respond. The
court becomes the final arbiter of the privilege."
The standard for determining the validity of the privilege in a
particular case was established by the Supreme Court in Hoffman v.
United States:5'7
innocuous question may provide the special agent with the clue he needs. Justice
Marshall recognized the problem in th6 trial of Aaron Burr: "Many links frequently
compose that chain of testimony which is necessary to convict any individual of a
crime. It appears to the court to be the true sense of the rule that no witness is
compellable to furnish any of them against himself." United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
38, 39-40 (C.C. Va. 1807).
The countervailing arguments are: (1) the purposes and policies of the privilege
are diluted when protection is afforded to frivolous claims of self-incrimination; (2) the
nature of the self-assessment system of taxation places a premium on being able to
secure evidence from the taxpayer; (3) the summons is generally being used prior to
the time the investigation becomes "a criminal case" (hardly persuasive because the
evidence can be used in the criminal case); (4) there are no inference problems at the
agent level. The agent's suspicion that the taxpayer has something to hide is not a real
problem because he is not the ultimate trier of fact and his recommendation for
prosecution must be based on legally admissible evidence, not suspicion of wrongdoing;
(5) If the taxpayer is represented by counsel, there is a reasonable probability that
interrogation will be fairly conducted and the taxpayer will not be bullied. After all,
as Justice Cardozo said in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937). "Justice...
would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry."
54. United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Pon-
der, 475 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnson, 465 F.2d 793, 796 (5th
Cir. 1972). But see United States v. Vadner, 119 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
55. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 198 (1955); United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1953); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
56. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2271 (McNaughton ed. 1961). The principle is
clearly articulated in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1953); "Indeed, in
the earlier stages of judicial experience with the problem, both extremes were advo-
cated, some saying that the bare assertion by the witness must be taken as conclusive
and others saying that the witness should be required to reveal the matter behind his
claim of privilege to the judge for verification. Neither extreme prevailed, and a sound
formula of compromise was developed. This formula received authoritative expression
in this country as early as the Burr trial. There are differences in phraseology but in
substance it is agreed that the court must be satisfied from all the evidence and
circumstances, and 'from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is
asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure would result.' (Citations
omitted.) If the court is so satisfied the claim of the privilege will be accepted without
further disclosure." See also UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 8 (1953).
57. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
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To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the
implication of the question, in the setting in which it was asked,
that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why
it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious dis-
closures could result . . . [It must be] . . .perfectly clear, from
a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, ...
that the answer cannot possibly have such tendency to incrimi-
nate."
The approach of the Supreme Court in Hoffman has been consis-
tently approved in principle by the courts,," but, in application, the
Fifth Circuit appears to have strayed from its teachings.
The Fifth Circuit's current view of the privilege and the stan-
dards applicable to testing the validity of the privilege defense in tax
proceedings originate in United States v. Roundtree.6 '° The court re-
jected the privilege as a defense to the summons prior to a recommen-
dation for criminal prosecution despite the fact that the evidence
gained might be used against the taxpayer in a subsequent criminal
proceeding, provided the government established the civil nature of
the tax investigation." This decision confuses the "improper pur-
pose" test, the standard determining whether the service can use the
summons, with the Hoffman approach for testing the validity of the
privilege as a defense.2 The confusion created by Roundtree was
continued in United States v. Prudden' where the Fifth Circuit re-
58. Id. at 486, 487, 488 (1951). (Emphasis added.)
59. See the discussion by Chief Judge Friendly in In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 85
(2d Cir. 1973).
60. 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1969).
61. "We may quickly dispose of Roundtree's contention as to self-incrimination
and the objections of the IRS .... We have already pointed out that if Roundtree is
able to prove that the sole purpose of the summons is to build a criminal prosecution,
the summons must fall .... If the IRS sustains its contention that this is a civil
investigation, the mere fact that the evidence might be used against Roundtree in a
later prosecution will not support a claim of self-incrimination." United States v.
Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 852 (5th Cir. 1969).
62. See text accompanying note 153 infra. In Roundtree the court cited Venn v.
United States, 400 F,2d 207 (5th Cir. 1968), for the proposition that information ob-
tained by governmental compulsion supported by court sanctions and without granting
immunity may be admissible at a subsequent criminal prosecution. However, Venn
involved no fifth amendment issue, and the court relied on Sanford v. United States,
358 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1966), for its rule that evidence obtained for an improper purpose
may be admissible at a criminal trial. Sanford concerned no privilege against compul-
sory self-incrimination because the court expressly stated "[n]o Fifth Amendment
rights are involved."
63. 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1971). It is interesting
to note that Prudden involved a joint investigation where a revenue agent continued
his audit after referral to the Intelligence Division without notice to the taxpayer.
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quired the taxpayer to prove that the "proceeding had become an
inquiry with dominant criminal overtones" 4 before assertion of the
privilege. In a subsequent district court opinion, United States v.
Ruente,7 the privilege against self-incrimination was further emascu-
lated when a summons was enforced against a taxpayer and the pro-
duction of his private records was compelled. The district court cited
Donaldson and Roundtree for the proposition that the privilege can-
not be invoked in a civil tax investigation; but what Donaldson said
was that the existence of the civil determination would negate an
improper purpose argument. Donaldson did not involve a summons
directed to a party claiming protection of the privilege, but rather
intervention when the summons was directed to a third party. Nor
did Donaldson involve protection of the constitutional privilege."
Although Roundtree indicated that a summons would be en-
forced over a self-incrimination defense if the government could dem-
onstrate the civil character of the investigation, Prudden shifts the
burden to the taxpayer and requires him to prove that the investiga-
tion is purely criminal. In United States v. Ponder,7 the Fifth Circuit
refused to overrule a district court order compelling compliance with
a summons because the taxpayer "advanced no evidence indicating
how production of the requested documents and records would in-
criminate him." Hoffman does not require an individual to introduce
evidence to establish the privilege, but recognizes that such evidence
or an explanation of why it cannot be produced may be as incriminat-
ing as the evidence sought and result in dangerous disclosures. "
Roundtree, Prudden, Ponder, and Ruente are wrong because the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination is available to prevent compulsion of
64. Id. at 1031.
65. 31 A.F.T.R. 2d 73-701 (W,.D. La. 1973), aff'd. 33 A.F.T.R. 2d 74-332 (5th Cir.
1973). What does this decision do to the principles announced in Boyd?
66. In Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 522 (1971), the Supreme Court
made clear at the outset that there was "no constitutional issue in the case."
67. 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 80,896 (5th Cir. 1973). One of the authors believes that
Ponder and Roundtree are incorrect for an additional reason: requiring an in camera
inspection to aid in its determination whether the taxpayer was properly invoking his
privilege. This may be a necessity, particularly in a taxation case, but the Supreme
Court has not held the taxpayer must devulge part of the otherwise protected materials
in order to salvage the remainder. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Moreover,
it has been stated that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination has become
almost "self-operating and there is nothing for the trial court to determine." B.
GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 236 (1969). But
see United States v. Moore, 485 F.2d 1165, 1167 (5th Cir. 1973): "Even the court's offer
to inspect in camera was declined."
68. If the government's need for the information is overriding, the government can
always grant the taxpayer immunity as a quid pro quo for waiver. See Lefkowitz v.
Turley, 410 U.S. 924 (1973); McCarthy v. Ardnstein, 262 U.S. 355 (1923).
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potentially incriminating evidence regardless of the nature of the
proceeding in which the evidence is sought; the rule applies to books
and records as well as oral testimony."'
DOCUMENTS IN TAXPAYER'S POSSESSION
Since Boyd v. United States' private books and papers of the
individual have been protected by the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination and against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Thus, a Revenue Service summons directing taxpayer to produce his
own records and documents in his possession can generally be resisted
69. See the following passage from McCarthy v. Ardnstein, 266 U.S. 3440 (1924):
"The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceedings in which
the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceed-
ings wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who
gives it." In Lefkowitz v. Turley, 410 U.S. 924 (1973), the Supreme Court recognized
McCarthy as "the settled view in this Court." See Guy v. Abdulla, 58 F.R.D. 1, 2 (N.D.
Ohio 1973) ("[Slcope of protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment is sufficiently
broad to encompass civil pre-trial discovery.") In short, at enforcement proceedings
the taxpayer has the right to withhold incriminating data, and the courts must liber-
ally favor and respect invocation of the privilege. It makes no difference what type
proceeding it is, and should the court require the individual to succumb to the Service's
demands or face contempt, any evidence obtained or tainted thereby is inadmissible
in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
70. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886): "The principles laid down in this opinion affect the
very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the con-
crete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they
apply to all invasions on the part of the Government and its employees of the sanctity
of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors and the
rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of this offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefensible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public
offense, - it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the
essence of Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking into a house and opening boxes and
drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion
of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict
him of crime or to forfeit his goods is within the condemnation of that judgment. In
this regard, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.
"We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two Amendments,
They throw great light on each other. For the 'unreasonable searches and seizures'
condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of
compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is con-
demned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself', which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light
on the question as to what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a
man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially
different from compelling him to be a witness against himself .. " Id. at 633.
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on fifth amendment grounds.7 The scope of the protection afforded
extends from taxpayer's home to his business office,72 provided his
enterprise is not a corporation or large partnership.
To what extent does the privilege protect documents owned by
another but in possession of the taxpayer? In Couch v. United
States,"' the Supreme Court in holding that the taxpayer may not
invoke the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to prevent
production of records in her accountant's possession, affirmed the
basic rule that possession, not ownership, is determinative of the
privilege because the necessary element of compulsion is on the pos-
sessor. If an accountant transfers his workpapers to taxpayer before
the summons is issued, he should be able to invoke the privilege so
long as he is in possession.7 Underlying Couch is the Ninth Circuit
71. Ardnstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920); Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d
459 (5th Cir. 1969) (and cases cited therein); United States v. Silverstein, 210 F. Supp.
401 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afJ'd, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963).
72. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme Court indicated
that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places." See Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The decisions dealing with the protection afforded at
business establishments have not been entirely consistent. The outcome of a particular
case may depend on the nature of the business. In Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582, 592 (1946), Justice Douglas' well attuned sensitivities were not offended by the
search of a service station: "And the search was of the office adjacent to the
pumps-the place where petitioner transacted his business ...
"The facts distinguish this case from such cases as Amos v. United States, 255
U.S. 313 where officers without a search warrant swoop down on a private residence
.... The filling station was a place of business, not a private residence." In United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), the court permitted warrantless inspection of a
federally licensed firearms dealer on grounds he must have expected such inspections
when he entered the business and because the inspections "pose only limited threats
to the dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy."
73. 409 U.S. 322 (1973). The Couch opinion is noted in several recent periodicals.
See Note, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 211 (1973); Note, 1 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 506 (1973); Note,
26 U. FLA. L. REV. 142 (1973); Note, 10 HOUSTON L. REV. 980 (1973); Note, 34 LA. L.
REV. 133 (1973); Note, 48 TUL. L. REV. 160 (1973). See also M. Coffee, Supreme Court's
Couch Decision Signals New Directions In Guarding Client's Records, 38 J. TAXATION
258 (1973); Comment, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 106.
74. The notion that rightful possession as opposed to legal title is the proper
standard for determining whether taxpayer may invoke his privilege to prevent en-
forcement of a service summons was recognized at least as early as Application of
House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 101 (W.D. Cal. 1956): "The argument of the government is
. . . that the application of the privilege against self-incrimination turns on the differ-
ence between rightful indefinite possession and legal title. Nothing in the cases sub-
stantiates this notion that a narrow concept of property law should determine the
availability of Constitutional guarantees against self-incrimination." However, the
court concluded that even assuming property concepts were involved "there was an
express agreement between the accountant and the taxpayer that ownership in the
papers should become vested in the taxpayer at the moment of transfer of the papers
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decision, United States v. Cohen7" which indicated that even "wrong-
ful possession" of incriminating materials suffices for invoking the
fifth amendment privilege. However, this rationale was modified in
Couch by the Court's admonition that it was not deciding "what
qualifies as rightful possession." The Court in Couch also rejected
legal title theories often relied on by lower courts to deny the applica-
bility of the privilege where the accountant transfers his workpapers
after the investigation begins. " The lower courts must use the stan-
dard of rightful possession in ascertaining whether a taxpayer may
validly invoke the self-incrimination right. As a general rule if the
taxpayer is in possession of material when a summons is issued, he
is protected against the production by invoking his privilege.77 If the
accountant or other person makes a "frantic pre-summons pitch-
out ' 7' to taxpayer under facts similar to Cohen, taxpayer ought not
to be protected on the theory that he lacks rightful possession.
REQUIRED RECORDS DOCTRINE
Not all the records in an individual taxpayer's possession at the
time a summons is issued are protected by his constitutional rights.'
to the taxpayer's agents." Id. at 102. See also United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d
68 (7th Cir. 1968) (and cases cited therein); Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d 739 (D.C.
Cir. 1964); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Fisher, 352 F.
Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See Note, 23 Sw. L.J. 728 (1969).
75. 388 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1967). In Cohen, special agents presented them-
selves to the taxpayer and requested to examine his books and records. The taxpayer
informed them the records were in the hands of his accountant in Beverly Hills. Before
the agents could get to the accountant's office the taxpayer appeared and demanded
his records and workpapers. The accountant obliged and when the agents appeared,
he informed them taxpayer had the records. The agents served a summons on taxpayer
to produce and he refused. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court denial of en-
forcement holding the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination barred forced
production of the documents even though they were not owned by taxpayer. See Note,
20 HAST. L.J. 1001 (1969). In United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1971),
the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected the Cohen decision.
76. In Boschour v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963), the court relied
heavily upon an ownership theory to deny the assertion of the privilege. See also United
States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D. N.J.), afi'd, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959).
77. For the proposition that "the rights and obligations of the parties became
fixed when the summons was served" see Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973);
United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Zakutan-
sky, 401 F.2d 68, 72 (7th Cir. 1968).
78. United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1972). For an excellent
discussion of the difficulties encountered by accountants in this "constitutional law
thicket" see E. Ord, The IRS's Right of Access to the CPA's Workpapers and Client
Records, 1973 TAX ADVISER 516.
79. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). See Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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In Shapiro v. United States,'" an individual operating his business in
noncorporate form was compelled by subpoena to produce certain
documents relating to the sale of commodities. The records were
required to be kept by the Emergency Price Control Act. After pro-
duction of the documents and the ensuing investigation, petitioner
was convicted of criminal violations of the Act. In a five to four
decision, the court held the privilege against self-incrimination
inapplicable:
The question still remains with respect to the,nature of the docu-
ments and the capacity in which they are held. It may yet appear
that they are of a character which subjects them to the scrutiny
demanded and that the custodian has voluntarily assumed a duty
which overrides his claim of privilege. . . . The principle applies
not only to public documents in public offices, but also to records
required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable
information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of
governmental regulations and the enforcement of restrictions val-
idly established. There the privilege, which exists as to private
papers, cannot be maintained.'
The Shapiro decision has spawned a great deal of comment 2 and
it is beyond the scope of this article to explore all its ramifications.
The Internal Revenue Service has generally not attempted to apply
the required records doctrine to income tax investigations" although
the Internal Revenue Code clearly requires the taxpayer to keep re-
cords.'"
80. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
81. Id. (Emphasis added.)
82. See Barney, The Protection of Documents in Criminal Tax Fraud Cases, 44
TAXES 626 (1966); Cooper, Federal Agency Investigation Requirements for the Produc-
tion of Documents, 60 MICH. L. REV. 187 (1961); Lipton, Required Record Keeping and
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX 1331 (1956);
Pemberton, Tax Fraud Investigations and the Required Records Doctrine, 46 TAXES
209 (1968); Weis, Self-Incrimination and Income Tax Investigations, 42 TAXES 706
(1964).
83. In Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1969), the Fifth Circuit
noted: "The Government's brief cites Falsone v. United States ... for the proposition
that a taxpayer is not protected from production of his own records, since he is required
to keep such papers . . . and then adds that 'the Department of Justice has, however,
refrained from making that argument in recent years.' In any event, Falsone was a
wholly civil proceeding in which there was no indication, as there is here, that a
criminal investigation had begun." Query, what difference does it make what type
proceeding for fifth amendment purposes if there exists the danger of relinquishing
incriminating data? But see Stern v. Robinson, 262 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Tenn. 1966),
appeal dism'd, 391 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1968).
84. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6001. "Although § 6001 . ..requires that every
person liable for any tax must keep books and records and make returns as may be
19741
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
One wonders, however, to what extent the required records doc-
trine will be resurrected by the Internal Revenue Service when agents
attempt to compel production of records required by other laws and
Executive Orders now within its jurisdiction to enforce. For example,
both the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970" and certain regulations
issued pursuant to Executive Orders arising out of the recent energy
crisis "" require certain persons to keep extensive records in order to
promote declared public policies. In both instances, the Internal Rev-
enue Service is charged with enforcing compliance and has issued
extensive regulations requiring detailed records. If production of the
records is necessary to investigate violations of laws that require re-
cords to be maintained, the privilege should not be available because
of Shapiro. Suppose, however, that an agent summons the records
pursuant to an alleged violation of the Economic Stabilization Act
and discovers evidence of income tax evasion. Can the government
proceed with the income tax case? Although the authors question the
soundness of the Shapiro doctrine, we submit that if it is to be re-
tained it should be a narrowly construed exception to the privilege
against self-incrimination. 7 Evidence gained from so-called "quasi-
public records" should be used only to foster the public purpose of
the statute which originally required the keeping of the records."
required and to file such a return and indicate the amount of income he receives, the
taxpayer is free to refuse to fill in particular items on his return and when subsequently
questioned as to those admissions, he may assert his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination." Justin A. McNamara, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 11 (1973).
In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1967), the Supreme Court appeared to
have dispelled any governmental hope that Shapiro is applicable to tax records. The
court concludes: "The government's anxiety to obtain information known to a private
individual does not without more render that information public; if it did, no room
would remain for the application of the constitutional privilege. Nor does it stamp
information with a public character that the Government has formalized its demands
in the attire of a statute; if this alone were sufficient the constitutional privilege could
be entirely abrogated by any Act of Congress." But see, United States v. Turner, 480
F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973). "[True that Turner may be able to assert a Fifth Amend-
ment defense to production of his records that is unavailable to a person holding
corporate records or documents belonging to another. . . .But this defense depends
upon the nature of the documents themselves rather than the reasons for which the
government may wish to examine them." Id. at 276. See also Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322 (1973) (no expectation of privacy in system depending so heavily upon
self-assessment).
85. See 12 U.S.C. § 190 (1970).
86. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11743 § 6, 310, CCH 306 ENERGY MANAGEMENT.
87. See Note, 34 LA. L. REV. 133 (1973).
88. It should be noted in passing that where the taxpayer knows his records are
incriminating, he may be inclined to destroy them. A contempt for wrongful conduct
is appropriate in this case. See United States v. Boudreaux, 71-2 U.S.T.C. 87209 (E.D.
La. 1971). Although the government has the burden to show that records existed and
were available at issuance of the summons, United States v. Silvio, 333 F. Supp. 264
(W.D. Mo. 1971), such action of destruction creates an inference of guilt.
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SEARCH WARRANTS
The Internal Revenue Service is currently testing the extent to
which a search warrant issued pursuant to section 760811 may be
substituted for a section 7602 administrative summons. In several
cases," the government has argued that a reasonable search con-
ducted pursuant to a warrant issued on "probable cause""' within the
meaning of the fourth amendment does not trigger the fifth amend-
ment privilege."2 In Hill v. Phillpot,"' a special agent persuaded a
federal district judge to issue a warrant to search a physician's home
and office for financial records by presenting affidavits of four former
employees that indicated the records would be destroyed if the sum-
mons process was employed. Apparently, Dr. Hill had instructed his
employees to keep "any tax man" busy in the reception area so that
the records could be placed in the incinerator before they could be
inspected. According to the affidavits, the doctor kept separate "Red
Letter Folders" for certain patients. There was also evidence that
checks from these patients were negotiated without being deposited
in the doctor's account. Armed with warrants, Internal Revenue Serv-
ice agents searched the doctor's home and office and seized and re-
moved thirty-five cartons of books, records, and papers. The next
day, the physician petitioned the district court for an order to show
cause why the property seized should not be returned on grounds that
the seizure was in violation of his fourth and fifth amendment rights.
The court rejected the constitutional arguments. On appeal, the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the search and seizure
violated the privilege against self-incrimination.
The government admitted that the privilege would have effec-
tively blocked production of the records had they been sought by
administrative summons. The government argued, however, that
since the warrant issued, the inquiry should be limited to the ques-
tion whether there were reasonable grounds under the fourth amend-
ment. "In short, the government takes the position that once validity
89. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7608(a) (2); See Lipton, Search Warrant in Tax
Fraud Investigations, 56 A.B.A.J. 941 (1969); Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure govern the issuance of warrants. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2231 (1970).
90. Hill v. Phillpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1971); Vonder Ahe v. Howland, 73-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 80,716 (9th Cir. 1973).
91. For discussion of defenses to a search warrant, see Kipperman, Inaccurate
Search Warrant Affidavits as Ground for Suppressing Evidence, 84 HAzv. L. REV. 825
(1971).
92. In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303 (1967), the Supreme Court left open
the question "whether there are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes
them from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure."
93. 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1971).
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of a search is established under the Fourth Amendment. . .the Fifth
Amendment is not and cannot be violated.""4 1n rejecting this argu-
ment, the Seventh Circuit stressed the relationship between the
fourth and fifth amendments and held the search violative of the fifth
amendment. Rejecting Wigmore'sl5 contention that there is no testi-
monial compulsion when records are seized since the proof of their
authenticity must be made by the testimony of others, the Court
stated that the jury knows the books and records belong to the defen-
dant and the entries therein speak against him as clearly as his own
voice.
Similar attempts to use the search warrant technique have been
rejected by the Ninth Circuit,'" which follows the Hill v. Phillpot
rationale, and approved by the Sixth Circuit"7 which favors the
Wigmore approach. There appears little logic in the proposition that
the fifth amendment privilege depends on the form deployed to ob-
tain the incriminating evidence involving testimonial communica-
tions.
TAXPAYER'S RIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO SUMMONS DIRECTED TO THIRD
PARTY
The search for incriminating evidence conducted by special
agents does not stop with the taxpayer. Regardless of the degree of
taxpayer cooperation in the investigation, the Service will generally
examine the records of banks, brokerage houses, savings and loan
companies, and other financial institutions to make the investigation
as complete as possible. These financial institutions usually cooper-
ate and no summons is issued. It is well settled that absent special
circumstances"8 such third parties have no right to refuse pro-
94. Id. at 146.
95. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
96. Vonder Ahe v. Howland, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 80716 (9th Cir. 1973).
97. United States v. Blank, 459 F.2d 383, 385 (6th Cir. 1972): "We believe that
there is a valid and important distinction between records sought by subpoena and
records sought by search warrant. The subpoena compels the person receiving it by
his own response to identify the documents delivered as the ones described in the
subpoena. The search warrant involves no such element of compulsion upon an actual
or potential defendant." See also, United States v. Scharfman, 448 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir.
1971).
98. The fifth circuit opinion in Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459 (5th Cir.
1969), is illustrative of the special circumstances exception. In Stuart the court refused
to compel production of taxpayer's records although in possession of the accountant
at the time the summons issued. The taxpayer worked nights and placed the data in
the accountant's possession for the convenience of the agents. In upholding the
protection afforded by the privilege, the court stressed the purpose for which the papers
[Vol. 34
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duction of the documents on the grounds that such information might
incriminate the taxpayer.?! It is equally clear that the taxpayer has
no right to object to the production of the information merely because
such data produced will incriminate him. As Justice Holmes said: "A
party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its pro-
duction."""' Wigmore justifies the rule on the rationale that the proof
of authenticity must be made by the testimony of others "without
employment of the accused's oath or testimonial responsibility."",
The Supreme Court recently stated the reason more clearly when it
pointed out that requiring a third party to produce evidence involves
no element of personal compulsion against the accused."'2
When the special agent encounters resistance from the taxpayer
in his search for evidence, he knows that information relative to the
taxpayer's financial affairs can usually be uncovered by examining
the files of the taxpayer's attorney, accountant, or tax preparer. The
scope of the government's right to examine the attorney's files for
incriminating evidence is generally circumscribed by the ownership
and nature of the documents in the attorney's possession at the time
the summons is served. If the taxpayer has placed his personal and
private papers in the hands of his attorney for purposes of seeking
legal advice regarding the tax investigation, the records should be
protected by the privilege against self-incrimination." 3 In United
were delivered to the accountant. In Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 333 (1973),
the Supreme Court posited the following exceptions to the rule: "[1] where construc-
tive possession is so clear or [21 relinquishment of possession is so temporary and
insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially
intact."
99. "The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate
himself is purely a personal privilege of the witness. It was never intended to permit
him to plead the fact that some third person might be incriminated by his testimony,
even though he were the agent of such person." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70
(1906). See also Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951); McAlister v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 90 (1906); United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 344 n.10 (M.D. Pa.
1973).
100. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
101. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
102. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). In Couch, taxpayer's bank
statements, payroll records, and reports of sales and expenditures were customarily
placed in the accountant's possession for preparation of annual tax returns. Although
all records were admittedly owned by taxpayer, the Court refused to grant immunity
under the fifth amendment since without possession there was no governmental com-
pulsion placed upon the taxpayer. Since the opinion has been fully discussed in other
legal periodicals we shall not further discuss the case in this paper. See note 72 supra.
103. "lIlf the Service can secure documents and records from the attorney which
they could not obtain if in the possession of the taxpayer, chaos would result. The
attorney would be unduly hampered in the preparation of the case. He would not want
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States v. Judson, '" the Ninth Circuit articulated the reasons for this
rule:
But instead of closeting himself with his myriad tax data drawn
up around him, the taxpayer retained counsel. Quite predictably,
in the course of the ensuing attorney-client relationship the perti-
nent records were turned over to the attorney. The government
would have us hold that the taxpayer walked into his attorney's
office unquestionably shielded with the Amendment's protection,
and walked out with something less. The way was clear, accord-
ing to appellant, for an enforcement officer to gather up the evi-
dence which otherwise would have been beyond his reach. The
taxpayer's only recourse would be the marathon footwork indi-
cated in House.' "'
But all of the taxpayer's records in the possession of his attorney
are not protected. In many instances a law firm may have represented
a client for a long period of time and accumulated records over the
years. It is true that the attorney's letters and memoranda to the
client may be protected by the attorney-client privilege, but the files
may contain deeds, agreements with third parties, corporate charters,
stock certificates, bank and financial statements, and other informa-
tion which might tend to incriminate the client. Most of these docu-
ments are not within the protection afforded by the attorney-client
privilege.'""' Are they protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination?
Although the facts in Couch involved the possession of the tax-
the documents delivered to him lest he be served with a subpoena to deliver them as
soon as his client departs. Such a condition is unthinkable." Lay, Attorney's Assertion
of His Client 's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination In Criminal Tax Investigations, 21
U. MIAMi L. REV. 854, 864 (1967). But see Note, 74 YALE L.J. 539 (1965).
104. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
105. Id. at 466.
106. The reason why such information is not protected by the attorney-client
privilege stems from the traditional rule that documents are not covered by the
privilege, particularly pre-existing ones. In United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 762
n.9 (5th Cir. 1973), the Fifth Circuit noted "an alternative reason for not obeying the
summons, White might have argued that the documents were protected by the
attorney-client privilege. This argument has been uniformly rejected by the courts on
the ground that pre-existing documents such as an accountant's workpapers cannot
constitute a confidential communication between the attorney and his client." For a
general discussion of the area see Lofts, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Federal Tax
Investigations, 19 TAX L. REV. 405 (1964); Peterson, Attorney-Client Privilege in Inter-
nal Revenue Service Investigations, 54 MINN. L. REv. 67 (1969). See also Note, 19 CATH.
U.L. REV. 540 (1970); Note, 74 YALE L.J. 539 (1965).
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payer's records by her accountant, the Court stressed the duration"'"
and purpose of the accountant's possession. In Judson, the theory
that the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege could be asserted by
the attorney in possession of the records appears partly founded on
the purpose for which the records were delivered to the attorney.
Extrapolating from Couch and Judson, records owned by the tax-
payer, but in possession of his attorney for many years, and not
placed with counsel in connection with pending tax investigation or
trial preparation, may not be protected by the fifth amendment privi-
lege, unless there exist sound reasons justifying the extension of the
client's privilege to his attorney.
Recognizing the exception it was making to the general rule bar-
ring the assertion of the privilege by third parties, the Judson court
nonetheless felt justified because:
No other 'third party,' nor 'agent' nor 'representative' stands in
such a unique relationship between the accused and the judicial
process as does the attorney . . . . The attorney and his client
are so identical with respect to the function of the evidence and
to the proceedings which call for its production that any distinc-
tion is mere sophistry. 107
If Couch stands for the rule that actual possession is the neces-
sary element, then materials out of the taxpayer's hands would have
to be relinquished. However, the Supreme Court in Couch did not
discuss the issue of an attorney's possession, and in fact appears to
have afforded a reasonable rationale for maintaining the Judson rule
under the notion that the taxpayer constructively possesses materials
in his attorney's hands."6
Counsel retained by the taxpayer to assist in the defense of an
ongoing tax investigation will often request delivery of the accoun-
tant's workpapers. In this instance, the attorney is in possession of
material neither owned nor actually possessed by taxpayer, and the
106.1 In Bellis v. United States, 42 U.S.L.W. 4788, 4793 (May 28, 1974), the
Supreme Court emphasized that the subpoenaed records had been out of the tax-
payer's possession for three years.
107. 322 F.2d at 467. (Emphasis added.)
108. This view is rejected in Note, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 211, 218 n. 40 (1973):
"In respect to the raison d'etre of the self-incrimination privilege, such an approach is
hardly satisfactory, and apparently not consonant with the Couch Court's implied
notion of constructive possession, for there is no clear basis for distinguishing the
attorney's relation to his client from that of other agents, including accountants." The
Couch exception means something, and the authors believe as the Judson court, that
the attorney is in a "unique relationship between the accused and the judicial process."
See note 103 supra.
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majority of the decisions have held the fifth amendment inapplica-
ble.'' Indicative of this rule is the recent Fifth Circuit opinion in
United States v. White"" where workpapers of an accountant were
turned over to taxpayer's attorney who had been retained to prepare
a defense in a continuing tax investigation. The court ruled that since
the records were not owned by nor in actual or constructive possession
of taxpayer, there was no compulsion that would enable the attorney
to successfully assert the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege. The
109. The cases rejecting the claim of fifth amendment privilege where attorney is
in possession for taxpayer are based either on the principle that an attorney may not
assert the privilege on the client's behalf or, assuming he may, no privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination exists, or both. United States v. Moore, 485 F.2d 1165,
1168 (5th Cir. 1973) (Special agent of Revenue Service petitioned district court for
enforcement of summons issued to L (Lawyer) of T (Taxpayer). L moved to quash on
the basis inter alia that some of materials were owned by T and subject to the fifth
amendment privilege. The Fifth Circuit held the claim "frivolous," citing Couch.);
United States v. Cote, 465 F.2d 142, 145 (8th Cir. 1972) (L retained A (Accountant) to
aid in giving adequate legal advice to T, and advised T to file amended returns which
A prepared. Special agent summoned A to produce workpapers used in preparing
amended returns; A refused, stating L possessed them. Service summoned L who
refused, and sought enforcement. T was permitted to intervene and assert the fifth
amendment privilege among other defenses. The court of appeals concluded that T's
invocation of the privilege was "properly denied" citing Bouschor v. United States, 316
F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (A
transferred his workpapers to T who subsequently gave them to L. Service summoned
A to produce, but A informed he could not comply because he did not possess them.
The agent summoned L who refused. In enforcement proceedings, T intervened and
invoked his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The court held that A by
demanding return of the materials from T left T without rightful possession, a prere-
quisite to applicability of the privilege.); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th
Cir. 1963) (The Service summoned L to produce A's workpapers in L's possession. T
via L attempted to prevent production by asserting the fifth amendment privilege. The
Eighth Circuit held L may not assert privilege on T's behalf.); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d
383 (6th Cir. 1961) (After a tax investigation was under way, T, L, and A met and A
turned over his workpapers to L upon request. L gave the materials to L2. Twas served
with a summons to produce but refused, invoking the fifth. A then sent a letter to L2
to turn over his workpapers to the IRS. Summons was issued to L2 to turn over A's
and T's records. L2 refused, claiming his possession was equivalent to T's. The Sixth
Circuit held L2 not required to turn over T's papers, but that he must do so as to A's
workpapers since the demand for return by A left T without rightful possession.) See
also United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v.
Johnson, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 80,026 (D. Fla. 1972); United States v. Schoeberlein, 335
F. Supp. 1048 (D. Md. 1971); United States v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490 (N.D.N.Y.
1969); United States v. Conte, 300 F. Supp. 73 (D. Del. 1969); United States v. Boc-
cuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D. N.J. 1959); United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365 (M.D.
Ga. 1955). Cf. United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973). But see United
States v. Riland, 364 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Foster, 65-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 95,512 (W.D. Tex. 1965); Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal.
1956).
110. 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973).
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decision might be justified on the theory that taxpayer did not have
constructive possession because he neither owned nor ever actually
possessed the records. Although ownership is not required to assert
the fifth amendment privilege, it may be a factor in determining the
existence of constructive possession.
If we assume that rightful possession is the critical element of the
constitutional privilege as indicated in Couch, it seems clear the
materials would have been protected had they been in taxpayer's
possession when the summons was issued. Moreover, assuming
Judson is good law, it should make no difference whether the tax-
payer or his accountant delivers the records to his attorney.
The apparent antithesis of White is United States v. Riland"I
where the district court quashed one of two subpoenas for workpapers
of taxpayer's two accountants in the possession of his attorney. Since
the first accountant owned the papers and requested their return
prior to issuance of the subpoena, the court held the fifth amfiendment
privilege inapplicable because the attorney lacked rightful posses-
sion. However, taxpayer's privilege was available to prevent produc-
tion of the second accountant's papers in the attorney's possession.
Apparently the court believed that the attorney's rightful possession
terminated when the first accountant requested the return of his
workpapers."2 Although Riland may be distinguished from White in
that Riland involved pending litigation, the correctness of either
may well depend on how the facts are viewed. If one takes the position
that in the attorney's absence taxpayer had the right to invoke the
fifth amendment privilege because he would have been in possession
of the workpapers, the White opinion is unsound because an individ-
ual should not be required to forfeit other constitutional rights by
exercising the right to retain counsel. If, however, one views the privi-
lege unavailable in the attorney's absence because it is likely the
records would have remained with the accountant and unprotected
under the Couch decision, then the White decision is correct on fifth
amendment principles. This distinction is supported by both the
Riland and White opinions. While the Riland court found no evidence
indicating defendant would not have possessed the papers had the
attorney failed to obtain them, the White court (although expressly
111. 364 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
112. Although not entirely clear from the opinion, an actual request to return
records is presumably necessary to terminate rightful possession. This is implied from
the fact that the court found it unnecessary to determine whether the second accoun-
tant actually owned the documents (and therefore had the right to request their re-
turn), since he had not requested their return. But see United States v. Cohen, 388
F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
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discounting its importance) found no evidence that the taxpayer
would have possessed the papers in the attorney's absence."'1 The
theory simply means that an individual neither gains nor loses a
constitutional right by transfering materials to his attorney."4 The
principle is consistent with Judson since there taxpayer owned the
materials declared protected by the privilege and would have been
able to raise it had he retained them. The approach espoused may
be fitted within the "constructive possession" exception announced
in Couch and does no injustice to the "proper rule" enunciated by the
White dissent that rightful possession, actual or constructive of po-
tentially incriminating documents and papers is the standard to be
resolved "on a case-by-case basis.""' Under the facts of the particular
case the White majority concluded there was an absence of rightful
possession by the taxpayer.
Moreover, the rationale is partly in line with the Eighth Circuit
opinion in Bouschor v. United States"' that workpapers of an accoun-
tant turned over to taxpayer's attorney are unprotected by the fifth
amendment privilege. What appears unsound about the Bouschor
opinion is the proposition that an attorney may not raise his client's
privilege." 7 A consistent application of the above proposition man-
dates that if taxpayer transfers his private papers to counsel in con-
templation of litigation, the attorney may always invoke the fifth
amendment privilege so long as the taxpayer could have claimed it
absent the transfer. Moreover, if the taxpayer is in possession of the
113. United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 1973).
114. In Edison Electric v. United States Electric Lighting Co., 44 F. 294, 297
(1890), the court states that "[ilf documents are not privileged while in the hands of
a party, he does not make them privileged by merely handing them to his counsel."
The corollary to this principle is "documents which were protected in the hands of the
client do not lose their protection when transferred to an attorney." Peterson,
Attorney-Client Privilege in Internal Revenue Service Investigations, 54 MINN. L. REV.
67, 85 (1969).
115. Af'd en banc, 487 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1974).
116. 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
117. Lay, Attorney ' Assertion of His Client's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
In Criminal Tax Investigations, 21 U. MIAMi L. REV. 854, 855 (1967). "Various state-
ments may be found which embody the principle that '[tihe constitutional privilege
.. . is essentially a personal one' or that '[tlhe right of a person under the Fifth
Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege of the
witness.' Such forthright pronouncements may not, however, preclude an attorney
from invoking this privilege on behalf of his client, under the proper set of facts, since
they often have reference to the idea that it may not be asserted by a representative
of a nonprivileged organization such as a corporation .... A reading out of context
may distort the real meaning of the concept of a personal 'privilege' " But see Couch




accountant's workpapers prior to an investigation by the service and
turns the materials over to the attorney retained to aid in his defense,
a summons to produce the materials in attorney's possession should
likewise be ineffective, since the taxpayer could have claimed the
privilege under the rightful possession approach approved by Couch.
Conversely, a pre-summons "pitchout" from accountant to taxpayer
to his attorney should be ineffective to permit invocation of the privi-
lege on the grounds there exists no rightful possession." 8
To avoid strained interpretations of the fifth amendment privi-
lege and fine-line distinctions as expressed above, perhaps the best
approach stems from the sixth amendment right to counsel."" Since
the right to counsel envisions "effective counsel,"'12 it is inconceivable
to expect the attorney to adequately represent the interest of his
client unless he has materials necessary to understand the case. To
expect the attorney to visit the home or business of his client each
time he needs to refer to data ignores realities of modern practice and
places a severe strain on the attorney-client relationship. The judici-
ary should not lose sight of the complexity of tax law which mandates
that taxpayer's financial records be available to his attorney to assure
an adequate defense.
TAX PREPARER PROJECT
To achieve the legitimate end of flushing out "the unscrupulous
and incompetent tax preparer," the Internal Revenue Service has
commenced a project aimed at preparers who are not attorneys, certi-
fied public accountants or holders of treasury cards.'2 ' One of the
techniques employed may be described as "shop and summons."
Special agents with fictitious financial information appear at the tax
118. Compare United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1971) with United
States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967). See Ord, The IRS's Right of Access to
the CPA's Workpapers and Client Records, 1973 TAX ADVISER 516, 521. See also United
States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). But see United States v. C.D. Kasmir,
No. 73-1973 (5th Cir.). The Kasmir case is currently pending before the Fifth Circuit.
In this unreported decision the lower court sustained enforcement of a summons where
accountant transferred his workpapers to taxpayer, and taxpayer handed them over
to his attorney before the special agent could summons the materials. Cf. United
States v. Henry, 491 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1974).
119. Those commentators discussing the issue agreed the sixth amendment offers
a viable alternative to the fifth amendment privilege. See Ord, note 118 supra; Lay,
note 117 supra; Note, 74 YALE L.J. 539 (1965).
120. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
926 (1952).




preparer's office and request. that the preparer complete an income
tax return. If the return is improperly completed the agents comm-
ence an investigation and summon the preparer to produce the re-
turns, records, names, addresses and social security numbers of his
clients. Since the production of such information is likely to be in-
criminating, it would seem that the summons could be defeated by a
properly invoked fifth amendment claim. However, the circuits con-
sidering the question have ruled the privilege must yield to the gov-
ernment's legitimate interest in regulating tax preparers., 22 United
States v. Turner 2:1 involved a "John Doe" summons2 1 issued to a tax
preparer calling for the production of names and social security num-
bers of his clients. After evidence indicating improprieties was gained
by the shopping technique, the Seventh Circuit, relying on the ap-
proach of California v. Byers, 121 held that the policy of disclosure
outweighed the claim of privilege since the summons was directed at
an "essentially civil area of inquiry with only a mere possibility of
incrimination.' ' 2" The authors find great difficulty in accepting this
approach. If the possibility of incrimination exists and the records are
in possession of the individual summoned, the claim of the privilege
should be an absolute defense to their production. The proper result
is expressed in United States v. Lubus 17 where a district court refused
122. United States v. Carter, 482 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Turner, 480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir.
1973); United States v. Berkowitz, 355 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Pa. 1973). But see United
States v. Lubus, 370 F. Supp. 695 (D. Conn. 1974).
123. 480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973).
124. The defendant in Turner contended the summons suffered from overbreadth
since it failed to name the person whose returns were to be examined. The court
rejected the argument, citing United States v. Humble Oil, 346 F. Supp. 944,947 (S.D.
Tex. 1972), for the proposition that a "John Doe" summons is sufficient. The Fifth
Circuit reversed the lower court in Humble Oil, however, and it distinguished Turner
on the basis that the special agents "had already ascertained the tax preparer's delin-
quency in complying with code requirements in filing his client's returns and hence
placed him under investigation [while no one in this casel is under investigation for
filing faulty tax returns."
125. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
126. United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 278 (7th Cir. 1973).
127. 370 F. Supp. 695 (D. Conn. 1974). Although the result in Lubus appears
correct, the rationale of weighing the governmental interest against the individual's as
in Byers may be inappropriate in light of Couch. It is noteworthy that the Fifth Circuit
in United States v. Carter, 489 F.2d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 1973), cited the Supreme Court
opinion in Couch in ruling that "Carter's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination was not violated by the request. Carter is merely asked to resubmit
information which has been given to the Government previously under his signature
as preparer of the tax returns. The privacy and confidentiality protected by the Fifth
Amendment does not include information of this nature . . . . The fact that the
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to follow Turner and sustained the argument that compelling the tax
preparer to produce a list of his clients constituted a denial of his fifth
amendment privilege. If the Lubus decision is affirmed by the Second
Circuit on appeal, the circuits will be in conflict and the stage will
be set for a Supreme Court review of the question whether the Byers
approach is appropriate in the context of a federal tax investigation.
The outcome may very well depend on the particular facts of the case
which reaches the Supreme Court because in Lubus the information
was readily available to the government by computer since the re-
turns prepared by the taxpayer contained his identification number
and because the personal returns of the preparer were also under
investigation at the time the summons was served. 2
IMPROPER PURPOSE
Owing to the personal nature of the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, the fifth amendment rarely affords protection
against an Internal Revenue Service summons to third persons.,
Nevertheless, taxpayer may have a defense available regardless of the
nature of the records or who has possession if the district court finds
that a summons is being used for an improper purpose. Prior to the
Supreme Court opinion in Donaldson v. United States"O the doctrine
that a summons may not be used for an improper purpose posed an
obstacle to its issuance by special agents in criminal tax investiga-
tions."' In Reisman v. Caplin,'32 in dismissing an attorney's suit to
summons may produce evidence that subsequently may be used in a criminal prosecu-
tion is no basis for objection." (Emphasis added.) Under the Couch rule is it compul-
sion or privacy that plays the critical and decisive role? See In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d
72 (2d Cir. 1973). What does the nature of the information have to do with one's fifth
amendment privilege? Is the Carter court resurrecting Shapiro?
128. See Note, 40 J. TAXATION 266 (1974). In United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.
2d 512 (3d Cir. 1971), a certified public accountant was served with twelve summonses
each seeking production of a form equivalent to a tax return for a named person. The
petition disclosed that the Service wanted the records in connection with an investiga-
tion of the accountant's tax liability. The Court rejected the argument against compul-
sory self-incrimination. However, the decision is prior to the opinion of the Court in
Couch, and there may be some relevance that the documents held producible were the
business records of the client, not personal records of the accountant. See the dissent-
ing opinion of Judge Ainsworth in United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, aff'd en banc,
487 F.2d 1335, 1337 (5th Cir. 1973).
129. See text at note 103 supra.
130. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
131. United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Ruggeiro, 300 F. Supp. 968 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1970);
United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953).
132. 375 U.S. 440 (1964), noted in 14 CAir. U.L. REV. 99 (1965):
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enjoin the Internal Revenue Service from summoning records alleg-
edly subject to the Hickman work product rule, the Court indicated
that an Internal Revenue Service summons may be attacked if "the
material is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for
use in a criminal prosecution."' Shortly after its decision in
Reisman, the Court, in Powell v. United States,' expanded the im-
proper purpose doctrine to include the element of good faith:
It is the court's process which is invoked to enforce the adminis-
trative summons and a court may not permit its processto be
abused. Such an abuse would take place if the summons had been
issued for an improper purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer
or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any
other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular
investigation. '35.,
Thus it could be argued that Reisman and Powell stood for the propo-
sition that an Internal Revenue Service summons issued to aid in a
criminal tax investigation constitutes an improper purpose, at least
where the case displays "dominant criminal overtones." Lower courts
took the position, however, that unless an indictment was pending or
the sole purpose of the summons was to secure evidence for criminal
prosecution, it was legitimate.' : In Donaldson v. United States'37 the
Supreme Court wiped "the slate clean" by rejecting the contention
of taxpayer that a summons is not available for an investigation
primarily criminal in scope. The Court interpreted the Reisman dicta
to mean that only where an Internal Revenue Service summons is
utilized solely for criminal tax investigation is there an improper
purpose, and approved the "dual purpose""' of the section 7602 sum-
133. Id. at 449. In United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953),
a lower court refused enforcement of an Internal Revenue Service summons issued after
the taxpayer was indicted on the basis that the Service was simply attempting to aid
the Justice Department in making out its case. The district court expressed doubt
whether Congress ever intended that an Internal Review Service summons be used in
criminal tax investigations. The Reisman court arguably appears to have adopted the
O'Connor position, although it cited Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1956),
as authority. The Boren court concluded that "the existence of the possibility of crimi-
nal prosecution does not necessarily mean that there will be criminal prosecution."
134. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
135. Id. at 58. (Emphasis added.)
136. See the cases cited in Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 532-33
(1971); United States v. Mothe, 303 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. La. 1969).
137. 400 U.S. 517 (1971), noted in 32 MD. L. REV. 143 (1972). See also Comment,
1971 UTAH L. REV. 561; Note, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 226 (1971).
138. The term "dual purpose" was coined by the Sixth Circuit in United States
v. Held, 435 F.2d 1361 (6th Cir. 1970).
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mons. So long as there exists a civil aspect to the case, there can be
no abuse of process. Since the liability of a taxpayer virtually always
concerns both civil and possible criminal tax liability, post-
Donaldson decisions have little difficulty with this aspect of the stan-
dard.'31
The Donaldson court proposed the following standard for deter-
mining a summons' propriety:
We hold that under § 7602 an internal revenue summons may be
issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in good faith and
prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution.""
The seemingly simplistic Donaldson standard for determining
the outer limits of a summons' valid use is unsatisfactory. It does not
fix the time when the recommendation for criminal prosecution takes
place or what procedures are available to enable a taxpayer to meet
his burden of proving acts of impropriety.'4 ' Although the government
and some commentators" 2 espouse the view that Donaldson "held
that criminal use of the section 7602 summons becomes improper
after a recommendation for prosecution has been sent [from Internal
Revenue Service] to the Justice Department,""' 3 the authors fail to
discern that position from the opinion. It is more accurate to admit
that "Donaldson failed to identify which recommendation was criti-
cal: the initial recommendation of the special agent, the ultimate
recommendation of the IRS to the Department of Justice, or some
intermediate recommendation."' 4
4
The various decisions considering the recommendation issue
139. United States v. Moore, 485 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Cromer, 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 761 (5th
Cir. 1973), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 487 F.2d 1335 (1973); United States v.
Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973).
140. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971).
141. "The burden is on the taxpayer to demonstrate that the summons is being
used for the improper purpose of investigating only criminal behavior." United States
v. Oaks, 360 F. Supp. 855, 858 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
142. "The Court [Donaldson] concluded that in most cases the use of the sum-
mons ended at the time a formal recommendation for prosecution was made to the
Justice Department." Comment, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 561, 566. See Note, 32 MD. L. REV.
143, 152 n.48 (1972). But.see Fink, Use and Abuse of the Grand Jury in the Criminal
Tax Investigation, 50 TAXES 325, 326 (1972): "Until a taxpayer's case is actually recom-
mended by the Special Agent for criminal prosecution,, it, in theory, retains a civil
aspect and the Special Agent may issue summonses for the examination of the tax-
payer's books and records and of third party witnesses in order to forward his investiga-
tion." See generally E. Ord, The IRS's Right of Access to the CPA's Workpapers and
Client Records, 1973 TAx ADVISER 516, 520.
143. Note, 32 MD. L. REV. 143, 152 n.48 (1972).
144. United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1973).
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have held that a recommendation for prosecution occurs when (1) a
criminal case is actually pending,' (2) the special agent recommends
prosecution to his superior,' (3) the recommendation is forwarded in
writing to the Justice Department, 7 and (4) "the special agent dis-
cussed the case with an Assistant United States Attorney."' 4 The
first rule is unacceptable no matter how strictly one reads the
Donaldson standard. If the pending case involves a criminal tax pros-
ecution, a recommendation has previously occurred regardless of
where one draws the line. If the case involves a criminal prosecution
unrelated to tax liabilities, it is reasonable to infer that the Service
may be supplying the government evidence for the case, and thus
constituting an absence of good faith. To avoid any such temptation,
the summons ought not be enforced unless it can be affirmatively
demonstrated that material requested by the Service could not possi-
bly have a bearing on the case. The third position appears unsatisfac-
tory since by the time the recommendation is sent to the Justice
Department a rather strong case has been built against the taxpayer
with the aid of the summons.'11 The second rule appears the more
satisfactory since it affords the taxpayer protection while still allow-
ing the dual use of the summons, "at least in the early stages"'' and
thus prevents the "thwarting" of governmental interest which con-
cerned the court in Donaldson.
Since the Donaldson criteria establish a "two-pronged" test, 5'
not only must there be an absence of recommendation for criminal
prosecution, but also a lack of bad faith. Thus, if the agent delays a
recommendation in order to summon incriminating evidence, the ac-
tion would constitute an improper purpose.' 2 In United States v.
Kessler, 'r the district court denied enforcement of an Internal Reve-
145. United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d 40 (9tn Cir. 1971).
146. United States v. Weingarden, 333 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Mich. 1972), rev'd, 473
F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1973). In United States v. Oaks, 360 F. Supp. 855, 858 (C.D. Cal.
1973), the district court view was "recommendation of the local special agent in charge
of the case lis] . . . the operative act for determining the validity of a 7602 sum-
mons.
147. United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1972); United States
v. National St. Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Kyriaco,
326 F. Supp. 1184 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
148. United States v. Oaks, 360 F. Supp. 855, 858 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
149. Note, 25 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 114, 126 (1972).
150. Note, 32 Mn. L. REv. 143, 151 (1972).
151. United States v. Vey, 324 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Pa. 1971). See the dissent in
United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 764 (5th Cir. 1973). But see United States v.
Troupe, 438 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1971); compare United States v. Diracles, 439 F.2d 795,
796 (8th Cir. 1971).
152. But see United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 474 F.2d 1234 (6th Cir. 1973).
153. 153 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
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nue Service summons when the government refused to submit its files
relating to the taxpayer under investigation for in camera inspection:
[W]here the respondent produces some evidence adverse to the
government on these issues [good faith] and seeks discovery of
the government's records for additional evidence . . . and where
the government refuses without adequate justification to produce
the sought after records for in camera inspection . . .such ac-
tions give rise to the inference that the government is withholding
evidence favorable to respondent's contentions and it therefore
becomes wholly inappropriate for a court to lend its process to the
enforcement of such a summons."'
The Sixth Circuit has established its own standards for ascertaining
whether issuance of a summons is improper. In United States v.
Weingarden, "' the court of appeals concluded that the Donaldson
dual standard "is only dictum" and that the correct standard is
"whether the sole purpose of the issuance of the summons is for
criminal prosecution."' ' The Weingarden disregard of the court's
standard is tenuous. If the Supreme Court deliberately believes it is
rendering a holding, it is preferable to conclude that is the holding,
unless and until a future Supreme Court decides to the contrary. A
later decision by the Sixth Circuit appears to have departed from
Weingarden in favor of the Donaldson standards. In United States v.
Cleveland Trust Co.,'57 the district court refused to enforce an Inter-
nal Revenue Service summons served on a trustee while in temporary
possession of taxpayer's private papers on the grounds that members
of a governmental strike force investigating organized crime had
prompted the issuance. In reversing the lower court, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the district court finding of bad faith was "clearly
erroneous" because no indictment was pending against the taxpayer,
"nor [had] any recommendation for criminal prosecution [been]
made.""" The court's application of the Donaldson test seems incor-
154. Id. at 71.
155. 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973).
156. Id. at 460.
157. 474 F.2d 1234 (6th Cir. 1973).
158. Id. at 1235. But see United States v. Henry, 491 F.2d 702, 704 (6th Cir. 1974),
where the Sixth Circuit held that if the individual under tax investigation is under
indictment for federal narcotics charges (not criminal tax law violations), and the
materials sought in the summons on his attorney may assist the prosecution, enforce-
ment would be denied. The court pointed out that in neither Donaldson nor Couch
"was there a pending criminal prosectuion concerning the taxpayer under investiga-
tion, nor was the summons addressed to his lawyer in that criminal case." Compare
United State v. Henry, 491 F.2d 702, 704 (6th Cir. 1974) with United States v. Moore,
485 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1973).
19741
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
rect owing to its failure to distinguish the two-prong test. Donaldson
does not stand for the proposition that so long as the summons is
issued before recommendation it is never considered improper.
Perhaps, a recommendation for criminal prosecution for
Donaldson purposes is neither at the point when a report is filed with
the Justice Department nor necessarily when the special agent rec-
ommends prosecution to his superior. Nonetheless, when a detailed
report is submitted by the special agent to his group chief, the focus
on the taxpayer as a potential criminal offender is clear, and subse-
quent use of an Internal Revenue Service summons sharpens the
inference that it may become merely a discovery device for the De-
partment of Justice. Certainly a summons ought not to be issued
after a final conference'" at the district level has been held, since here
the determination is made whether to forward a recommendation to
the Regional Counsel.
In those cases where it is suspected that the Service is using the
summons solely for criminal tax investigation purposes, a difficult
intervention problem arises especially if the summons is directed at
a third party to produce records in which the taxpayer has no proprie-
tary interest. " If the summoned party is otherwise willing to comply,
taxpayer ought to be permitted to intervene to prevent a possible
abuse of the court's process. 6 ' Moreover, as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are applicable to an enforcement proceeding, discovery
should be available to determine whether the government is acting
in good faith. Since the Donaldson opinion, taxpayer may not inter-
vene in an enforcement proceeding unless he displays a "significantly
protectable interest."'' 2
Since the Internal Revenue Service is not obligated to notify the
159. "If upon completion of his investigation, the Special Agent recommends
criminal prosecution, established practice and Regulations provide for hearings at both
the District and Regional Counsel levels of the Internal Revenue Service. The District
level conference generally referred to as the 'final conference' is held before the Assist-
ant, Chief or Staff Assistant of the District or a group Supervisor. The Special Agent
is generally present at this conference but may not preside; also on occasion a Revenue
Agent may attend. It is the function of this conference to establish whether or not the
case should be further recommended for criminal prosecution. During the course of the
hearing the presiding officer describes the charge under consideration and receives
argument of fact and law from taxpayer or his counsel." Fink, Use and Abuse of the
Grand Jury in the Criminal Tax Investigation, 50 TAXEs 325, 327 (1972).
160. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
161. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
162. In Donaldson the court made it clear that a taxpayer qua taxpayer has no
right to intervene. There must exist "a significantly protectable interest" and, to the
extent the taxpayer has such an interest, whether he may intervene requires "the usual
process of balancing opposing equities." 400 U.S. at 530-31.
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taxpayer when it summons a third party, 3 taxpayer's remedy may
be limited to a motion to suppress at a subsequent trial."4 However,
the attempt to exclude evidence so late in the proceedings in lieu of
establishing defenses in the enforcement proceeding places an ex-
treme burden on the taxpayer's privilege against self-incrimination
and may subject taxpayer to a criminal prosecution based on evi-
dence inadmissible at trial." ' The better rule would be that the Serv-
ice notify the taxpayer whenever the summons is issued to third
parties. '
While it is settled that a recommendation for criminal prosecu-
tion during an appeal of a court order enforcing an Internal Revenue
Service summons is immaterial to the question of enforceability, 7 it
is unclear whether a recommendation made subsequent to issuance
but prior to compliance affects enforceability. The Supreme Court
in Couch ruled that a summons is tested as of the issuance date, and
thus, a transfer to the taxpayer's attorney after a summons was
served on the accountant had no effect."', It is appealing to apply this
principle to Donaldson-type cases in resolving the proper cut-off date.
However, the good faith standard ought to be instrumental: if the
special agent prolonged recommendation in bad faith, the summons
163. Scarafiotti v. Shea, 456 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1972); Application of Cole, 342
F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Beneford, 44 F.R.D. 231 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
164. In Donaldson, the court stated that a taxpayer may "always assert that
interest or that claim in due course at its proper place in any subsequent trial." 400
U.S. at 531. In United States v. Moore, 485 F.2d 1165, 1168 n.4 (5th Cir. 1973), the
court noted that "[a] judicial decision that enforcement of the summons is proper is
not a predetermination of the admissibility of evidence gained by it in a subsequent
criminal proceeding." See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
165. In United States v. Hickok, 481 F.2d 377, 379 (9th Cir. 1973), the defendant
sought a reversal of his conviction for tax evasion on the basis that the court erred in
not suppressing evidence allegedly obtained by a Revenue summons issued solely for
criminal prosecution. The court rejected the contention since it lacked "any facts to
substantiate his general conclusory allegation that administrative summons were im-
properly used solely to develop a criminal case against him. Thus, no factual issues
were presented requiring an evidentiary hearing."
166. See United States v. Moore, 485 F.2d 1165, 1168 n.4 (5th Cir. 1973): "To hold
otherwise would provide an added incentive to taxpayers to file appeals merely for
delay, and would needlessly stultify the enforcement of federal law."
167. Compare United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1973) (recom-
mendation after issuance of summons immaterial to its enforcement) with United
States v. Monsey, 429 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Kyriaco, 326 F. Supp.
1184 (C.D. Cal. 1971). "Lower courts have interpreted Donaldson to say that if a
recommendation for prosecution occurs after issuance of the summons, but before
compliance, an enforcement order will not be granted." Note, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 114,
126, (1972).
168. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ought to fail; if, on the other hand, there was an absence of bad faith,
the issuance-recommendation sequence is immaterial to the sum-
mon's enforcement.
INTERVENTION
Since the taxpayer under investigation by the Service has var-
ious constitutional and nonconstitutional defenses available to pre-
vent production of his records, and since the special agent frequently
desires to gather evidence before the taxpayer is aware of the criminal
investigation, the agent will turn to third parties for information. We
noted earlier that the Internal Revenue Service need not give the
taxpayer notice of a summons to a third person.6 9 However, if the
taxpayer learns that a summons has.been issued, the Supreme Court,
in Reisman v. Caplin,7" indicated that taxpayer qua taxpayer might
intervene in both the examination before the hearing officer and the
enforcement proceedings. 7' The Court's attempt in Reisman to es-
tablish guidelines in summons proceedings resulted in a substantial
increase in the number of attempted interventions by taxpayers.7 2
Thus, in Donaldson v. United States, '1:' the Supreme Court redefined
the Reisman rule and effectively limited the scope of intervention in
summons enforcement proceedings by requiring a potential inter-
venor to show he possesses a "significantly protectable interest" in
the subject matter.7 ' The parameters of the Donaldson rules have not
been clearly drawn. However, one gleans from the opinion that: (1)
169. See note 163 supra.
170. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
171. "In addition, third parties might intervene to protect their interest, or in the
event the taxpayer is not a party to the summons before the hearing officer, he,too,
may intervene." Reisnian v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
172. "Reisman v. Caplin seemed clearly to say that anyone 'affected by a disclo-
sure' might intervene before the special agent and in the district court. Soon there was
a flood of attempted interventions by taxpayers to challenge summons issued to third
parties, such as banks and employers, with varying results among the Courts of Ap-
peals." Lyons, Government Power and Citizen Rights In A Tax Investigation, 25 TAX
LAWYER 79 (1971).
173. 400 U.S. 517 (1971). In United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir.
1973), the Ninth Circuit concluded: "[i]ntervention is not a matter of right but the
court in its discretion, upon showing by the taxpayer of some protectable interest, may
permit intervention." See United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252
(7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Tosie, 336 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Mo. 1971). See
generally Comment, 1971 UTAH L. Rav. 561; Note, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 226 (1971).
174. In Donaldson, a special agent summoned the taxpayer's former employer and
his accountant requesting information and testimony relative to the taxpayer's deal-
ings with his employer for the years in question. Although the employer and the
accountant expressed their willingness to comply with the summons, the taxpayer was
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there is no intervention of right in an Internal Revenue Service sum-
mons enforcement proceeding; (2) a taxpayer should not be permit-
ted intervention when the summons seeks records of a third party in
the party's possession, unless there exists a significantly protectable
interest; (3) even if the potential intervenor displays a significantly
protectable interest, other more appropriate remedies may dictate
that intervention be denied;"' (4) a showing by the taxpayer that he
has an established privilege or a property interest satisfies the signifi-
cantly protectable interest test.
Thus, under the first principle even if the taxpayer satisfies the
requirements of Federal Rule 24(a) (2): that he has an interest relat-
ing to the property or transaction involved, that disposition of the
action might impair his ability to protect his interest as a practical
matter, and that his interest is not adequately represented; he may
still be denied intervention. The Court reached this result because
Federal Rule 81(a) (3) states that the rules apply in enforcement
proceedings "except as otherwise provided by statute or by rules of
the district court or by order of the court in the proceedings."7"
Under principles two and three, displaying a "significantly pro-
tectable interest" will not assure intervention. The taxpayer "may
able to obtain a preliminary injunction restraining compliance. The Service then peti-
tioned the district court for enforcement. The taxpayer sought to intervene citing Rule
24(a)(2) and alleging the special agents were guilty of bad faith in asserting that they
were merely attempting to determine his civil liabilities because they were special
agents charged with the investigation of criminal liabilities and consequently the issu-
ance of the summons was outside the scope of section 7602 of the Code. The Supreme
Court held the taxpayer could not intervene in the summons enforcement proceedings
because he did not have a "significantly protectable interest" in the material sought,
and that under section 7602 an Internal Revenue summons may be issued to aid a
criminal investigation if issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for
prosecution.
175. In Justice v. United States, 365 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1966), affd, 390 U.S. 199
(1968), the Sixth Circuit held intervention is mandated when a taxpayer challenges
enforcement of the summons on constitutional grounds. Donaldson expressly rejects
the Justice rationale and concludes "the taxpayer, to the extent that he has such a
protectable interest, as, for example, by way of privilege, or to the extent he may claim
abuse of process, may always assert that interest or that claim in due course at its
proper place in any subsequent trial." Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531
(1971).
176. See United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1971). See also United
States v. Moore, 485 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1973) (Taxpayer not permitted to intervene
owing to fact that he was adequately represented by summoned party who was his
attorney.) In United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 759 n.2 (5th Cir. 1973), the court
noted that "[tihe district court also denied the taxpayers' request to intervene in the
enforcement proceeding in order to protect their interest. Although this ruling may
have been erroneous . . . we do not consider it because taxpayers have not appealed."
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
always assert that interest or that claim in due course at its proper
place in any subsequent trial."'77 Since the taxpayer in Donaldson
sought to intervene on the grounds the summons was being utilized
for the improper purpose of gaining evidence for criminal prosecution,
the court is indicating "that if the Internal Revenue Service abuses
the courts' process through unlawful use of the section 7602 sum-
mons, evidence obtained should be excluded at any subsequent crim-
inal trial."'' Unquestionably, an individual abused by a court's pro-
cess has a "significantly protectable interest,"'7" and perhaps the
proposition that taxpayer's remedy is pre-trial suppression appears
a suitable alternative. Nonetheless, it is submitted that such a rule
may be unfair because the taxpayer is prevented from avoiding an
indictment based on evidence legally inadmissible at the criminal
trial. It does not seem justifiable to place such a stigma on the indi-
vidual in the name of the effective administration of the tax laws
when an earlier stage is available for the determination of the issue. ""
WAIVER
Despite the battery of powers possessed by Revenue agents,"'
resort to the administrative summons is rarely necessary since most
taxpayers approach the routine audit in a cooperative spirit, and
provide the agent with the information requested. Cooperation ordi-
narily stems from the belief that it buys the good will of the agent
and assures an expeditious determination of one's tax liability. More-
over, there is a general misconception that the Service can obtain any
information not willingly provided."'2 However correct this notion
may be statistically, in his act of cooperating, the taxpayer may be
waiving constitutional safeguards, and providing the government
177. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971). The court in Donaldson
states that what is a proper situation for intervention must be tested by the "usual
process of balancing opposing equities." Id. at 530.
178. Note, 32 MD. L. REV. 143, 145 (1972).
179. "Intervention is thus precluded unless the intervenor can show the records
summoned are within his fifth amendment privilege, subject to the attorney-client
privilege or that the court's process has been abused." Note, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 114,
117-18 (1972). (Emphasis added.) It does not necessarily follow that intervention under
such a showing will be permitted. See notes 171, 172, 173 supra.
180. Compare, Lipton, Constitutional Protection for Books and Records in Tax
Fraud Investigations, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX 945, 974 (1971) (Donaldson disap-
proved) with Lyons, Government Power and Citizen Rights in a Tax Investigation, 25
TAX LAWYER 79, 85 (1971) (Donaldson approved).
181. See text at note 1 supra,
182. Lipton, Constitutional Protection for Books and Records in Tax Fraud
Investigations, N.Y.U. 29rH INST. ON FED. TAX. 961 n.61 (1971).
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with evidence needed to establish a criminal case against him. It is
obvious that many taxpayers would not be so willing to comply with
the Service's request for an interview, or production of material, if
they understood the implications. Nonetheless, experience indicates
that often the Service will gain a great deal of information before
counsel is consulted and the flow has been stopped.
Since information voluntarily provided pursuant to an agent's
request technically involves no compulsion upon the taxpayer, no
violation of the individual's constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination has occurred.'" Thus the potentially incriminating evi-
dence may be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Moreover,
there has been no unreasonable search or seizure since the taxpayer
has voluntarily consented to the search." 4
To what extent do these rather facile answers to difficult waiver
problems disappear when the focus of the investigation changes from
primarily civil to criminal? If the revenue agent discovers evidence
of fraud in the course of a routine audit, he is instructed to suspend
the audit, and refer the case to the Intelligence Division.' 5 However,
183. Although it is sometimes stated that where a taxpayer voluntarily turns over
his books and records to a revenue agent he has waived his privilege against compul-
sory self-incrimination, Glotzbach v. Klavans, 196 F. Supp. 685 (D. Va. 1961), there
is technically no waiver, simply because there has been no compulsion. Grant v. United
States, 291 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Young, 215 F. Supp. 202 (E.D.
Mich. 1963). It is noteworthy that the decision in Glotzbach appears imminently
incorrect. In the case, Revenue agents requested T's (Taxpayer) consent to examine
his books and records on his business premises. The agents advised T that he need not
produce, and if he did, they could be used against him. T granted his consent to the
on-site examination, but the agents were unable to complete the examination, and
informed T of their intent to return. T transferred the material to L (Lawyer) who
informed the agents of his possession, and his refusal to permit further examination.
The agent summoned T and L to produce. L appeared but refused to comply on the
grounds that it would violate T's fifth amendment privilege. The Service petitioned
for enforcement, and the court upheld the summons, concluding that T had waived
his privilege by consenting to the original examination. There was no waiver of the
privilege in Glotzbach because there was an absence of compulsion.
184. Has there been a valid waiver of the fourth amendment if the taxpayer is not
informed of his right to refuse to consent to the inspection of his books and records?
See Schoepflin v. United States, 391 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1968). But see United States
v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1970). See especially Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (unnecessary to a voluntary consent to search that
police advise individual of his right to refuse to give consent).
185. United States v. Ruggeiro, 300 F. Supp. 968 (C.D. Cal. 1969); United States
v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928 (D. Md. 1968); United States v. Jaskiewicz, 278 F. Supp.
525, 536-37 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See Note, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 114, 115 (1972). See also
Lipson, Constitutional Protection for Books and Records in Tax Fraud Investigations,
N.Y.U. 29rH INST. ON FED. TAX 948, 972 n.96 (1971); Lipton, Constitutional Rights In
Criminal Tax Investigations, 45 F.R.D. 293, 332 (1968).
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it may be that he will continue the audit until he finds substantial
evidence of criminal guilt. In this light, is there not a point where the
agent should give the Miranda warnings? " Surely such a rule would
be 'difficult to apply. 7 Once the special agent enters the investiga-
tion, the need for Miranda warnings becomes more apparent. Al-
though the Supreme Court has not squarely ruled on the matter,"",
most circuit court decisions have refused to require the giving of
Miranda warnings when the special agent first contacts the tax-
payer.'" The rationale of these cases is usually based on an absence
of custody or limitation of freedom. This approach unduly restricts
the true spirit of the Miranda decision which was to assure that an
individual is aware of his rights in situations of governmentally insti-
gated stress.
186. See United States v. Remolif, 227 F. Supp. 420 (D. Nev. 1964).
187. In United States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
918 (1959), the Second Circuit held the government need not advise the taxpayer when
the nature of the investigation changes from civil to criminal. See also Lloyd v. United
States, 226 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1955); Legatos v. United States, 222 F.2d 678 (9th Cir.
1955). But see United States v. Guerrina, 112 F. Supp. 126, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
188. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), where the Court noted that
the agent had given taxpayer "her Miranda warnings as required by IRS directive."
(Emphasis added.)
189. The requirement of Miranda warnings in criminal tax investigations has been
held inapplicable in 9 of 10 Circuit Courts of Appeals. United States v. Engle, 458 F.2d
1017 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United
States v. Ramantanin, 452 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Nemetz, 450 F.2d
924 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Stribling, 437 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Chikata, 427 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d
1021 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Shlom, 420 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1969); Taglianetti
v. United States, 398 F.2d 558 (1st Cir. 1968). Only the Seventh Circuit has held that
Miranda warnings were required when investigation includes a special agent. United
States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969). In Dickerson the court concluded:
"We understand the teaching of Miranda to be that one confronted with governmental
authority in an adversary situation should be accorded the opportunity to make an
intelligent decision as to the assertion or relinquishment of those constitutional rights
designed to protect him under precisely such circumstances." 413 F.2d at 1114 (Em-
phasis added.) In rejecting what it labeled the "overbroad" Dickerson rationale, the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1028 (5th Cir. 1970) exempli-
fies the rationale of many of the circuits. The court states that: "We cannot agree that
every administrative official who confronts a citizen with a request for information that
might disclose criminal conduct, thereby exerts compulsion on the citizen that must
be dispelled by the Miranda placebo." In all due respect, the court in Prudden might
easily have distinguished "every administrative official" from the special agent whose
function is clearly criminal investigative in nature. He is a law enforcement officer as
significantly as the local police investigator. Moreover, when the focus of the criminal
investigation becomes centered upon the taxpayer, there is quite a difference from the
Prudden analogy of a bank examiner's questioning of a teller whose figures are out of
balance. There are a number of recent commentaries dealing with the Miranda require-
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In Mathis v. United States, "'" the Supreme Court expressly re-
jected the government's contention that tax investigations are im-
mune from the Miranda mandate. "' " ' However, since the defendant
in Mathis was incarcerated at the time the revenue agent had ques-
tioned him, the circuit courts have narrowly interpreted the opin-
ion." '" Nevertheless, the "badges of intimidation" are present when a
special agent examines a taxpayer as surely as when a plain-clothes
policeman interrogates the potential criminal offender. 192 There can
be no voluntary relinquishment of a known right' 3 if the individual
taxpayer has no idea he is the object of a criminal tax investigation,
and is unaware that he need not produce the materials requested or
respond to the special agent's inquiries.
Although special agents are now instructed to give comprehen-
sive Miranda-type warnings,"' and a few decisions have held that
failure to follow published administrative procedures may constitute
a denial of due process,"''5 we suggest the rule ought to be that if the
ments in tax investigations. Andrews, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax Investiga-
tions Under Escobedo and Miranda: The "Critical Stage, " 53 IOWA L. REV. 1074 (1968);
Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 45 F.R.D. 293 (1968);
Segal, The Miranda Warnings: To What Extent Must the IRS Comply in Tax Fraud
Investigations?, 39 J. TAXATION 76 (1973); Note, 56 VA. L. REV. 690 (1970).
190. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
190.1 For evidence that the Supreme Court may be retreating from the teaching
of Miranda, see Michigan v. Tucker, 42 U.S.L.W. 4887 (June 11, 1974).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1027 (5th Cir. 1970). See
also Lipton, Supreme Court's Decision in Mathis Likely to Have Very Limited Effect,
29 J. TAXATION 32 (1968).
192. The Intelligence Division enforces the statutory sanctions applicable to in-
come taxes, investigates possible criminal violations, recommends prosecution when
warranted, develops information concerning the extent of criminal violations of all
federal tax laws and measures the effectiveness of the investigation process. Treas.
Regs. § 601.107
193. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d
265, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1942): "[Wlaiver of the privilege must be informed and intelligent.
There can be no waiver if the defendants do not know their rights." But see Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1971). See also Garner v. United States, 42 U.S.L.W.
1170 (9th Cir. May 7, 1974); United States v. Ponder, 444 F.2d 816 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1971). Once records are voluntarily surrended, the Service has a
reasonable time to examine and copy, and demand by taxpayer does not violate fourth
or fifth amendment rights or convert government's possession to compulsory.
194. IRS Rel. IR. 949; CCH 1968 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. 6946 (Nov. 26, 1968):
"At the initialmeeting with a taxpayer, a Special Agent is now required to identify
himself, describe his function, and advise the taxpayer that anything he says may be
used against him. The Special Agent will also tell the taxpayer that he cannot be
compelled to incriminate himself by answering any questions or producing any docu-
ments, and that he has the right to seek the assistance of an attorney before respond-
ing."
195. United States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Heffner,
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special agent does not give the taxpayer a full explanation of his
rights at the initial contact, all evidence gained should be inadmissi-
ble at trial."'"
Should the taxpayer refuse to consent to an agent's request for
information, he may be summoned to appear before the hearing ex-
aminer. At the return date of the summons, it is clear Miranda
warnings are mandatory since the taxpayer's freedom has been signif-
icantly limited in that he faces criminal sanctions for a contumacious
refusal to appear."'7 If the taxpayer makes the deliberate and in-
formed choice to testify and produce records, he has waived his privi-
lege against self-incrimination as to the relinquished materials, " and
cannot subsequently suppress their introduction at trial. However, he
should be able to stop the inquiry at any time by invoking the privi-
lege if he believes that what he says or produces might tend to incrim-
inate him.""'
Experienced defense counsel rarely permit clients to appear in
person and testify. However, if a degree of cooperation appears desir-
420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969). In Leahey it was held a denial of due process when the
agent failed to scrupulously follow the News Release, noted in footnote 194 above. Yet
there are indications that their rule will not be accepted. In United States v. Dawson,
486 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1973) the Fifth Circuit rejected the contention raised
based on a Leahey argument, although indirectly: "It is unnecessary for this court to
decide the question thus posed for we find from the facts recited earlier that the special
agents substantially complied with both IRS News Releases. . . .Literal Compliance
is not required." See also United States v. Bland, 458 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1972) (held
special agent's failure to follow guidelines requiring him to identify himself as a special
agent not fatal where taxpayer did not know the difference between a special and
revenue agent.) Query, how are taxpayers ever going to know the difference unless they
are told?
196. A similar problem addresses itself in the joint investigation. If the revenue
agent suspends his audit and refers the case to the Intelligence Division, the special
agent may later request the same revenue agent be assigned to work with him. The
taxpayer may be cooperating with the agents under the notion that investigation
involves only civil deficiencies. Once more it is believed that where the focus of investi-
gation has changed its complexion from purely civil to a dual nature, fairness dictates
a full disclosure of the taxpayer's rights be made. The label placed on a particular
investigation, as joint civil-criminal, ought not control.
197. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 7203, 7210. See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 7604(b).
198. United States v. Murdoch, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931). "The privilege of silence
is solely for the benefit of the witness and is deemed waived unless invoked." See
United States v. Goldsmith, 272 F. Supp. 924 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (No waiver by failing
to claim fifth at hearing before administrative examiner).
199. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In a judicial proceeding such as an
enforcement hearing if the witness testifies partly and such testimony constitutes "an
admission of guilt or incriminating facts" he may not stop short in his testimony
because that would be a distortion. In such a case, taxpayer would have waived his
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able, and is handled by counsel under a power of attorney, can coun-
sel effectively waive the client's constitutional privilege by making
damaging admissions, concessions or by turning over the taxpayer's
materials? The authors are unaware of a decision on point. If an
attorney can invoke the client's privilege against self-incrimination,
it is logical to conclude he may effectively waive it. Cases on the
question whether the attorney may raise the privilege in the tax-
payer's absence are in conflict,2"" but the better view would allow the
attorney to raise the privilege.2" Thus waiver by the attorney becomes
a potentially troublesome constitutional question.
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S.
355 (1923); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2276 (McNaughton ed. 1961). See United States
v. Buck, 356 F. Supp. 370 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1973). In Buck a
taxpayer had cooperated with another federal agency by turning over his books and
records for copying. The district court held that such a relinquishment constituted a
waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination at a proceeding to enforce a revenue
summons seeking the same materials. The Fifth Circuit affirmed without opinion. The
lower court recognized that "[allthough waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination during one official investigation does not normally bar its assertion
during a later investigation, here the waiver extended to the allowance of extensive
document copying during the investigation . . . . For the court to refuse access to the
originals would be illogical and irrational." Id. at 379. The decision in Buck is surpris-
ing. To permit inter-governmental trading of information is one thing; to say, however,
that by allowing a governmental agency to copy one's records where there was no
danger of incrimination, and later find you have waived the privilege for all times is
something different. Under the approach espoused by the Supreme Court in Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), the element of compulsion would not be lacking
by requiring the person to furnish the government incriminating evidence. See United
States v. Burch, 490 F.2d 1300, 1303 (8th Cir. 1974).
200. Compare Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963) with United
States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
201. See Lay, Attorney's Assertion of his Client's Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Criminal Tax Investigations, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 854 (1967). But see
Note, 74 YAIE L.J. 539 (1965).
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